Cloud computing o ers the economies of scale for computational resources with the ease of management, elasticity, and fault tolerance. To take advantage of these bene ts, many enterprises are contemplating to outsource the middlebox processing services in the cloud. However, middleboxes that process con dential and private data cannot be securely deployed in the untrusted environment of the (edge) cloud.
ployed in the untrusted environment of the (edge) cloud. To securely outsource middleboxes to the cloud, the stateof-the-art systems advocate network processing over the encrypted tra c. Unfortunately, these systems support only restrictive middlebox functionalities, and incur prohibitively high overheads due to the complex computations involved over the encrypted tra c.
is motivated the design of S -a secure middlebox framework for deploying high-performance Network Functions (NFs) on untrusted commodity servers. S exposes a generic interface based on C to design and implement a wide-range of NFs using its out-of-the box elements and C++ extensions. S leverages S (a shielded execution framework based on I SGX) and I DPDK to securely process con dential data at line rate.
More speci cally, S provides hardware-assisted memory protection, and con guration and a estation service for seamless and veri able deployment of middleboxes. We have also added several new features for commonly required functionalities: new specialized C elements for secure packet processing, secure shared memory packet transfer for NFs chaining, secure state persistence, an e cient on-NIC timer for SGX enclaves, and memory safety against DPDK-speci c Iago a acks. Furthermore, we have implemented several SGX-speci c optimizations in S . Our evaluation shows that S achieves near-native throughput and latency.
Introduction
Modern enterprises ubiquitously deploy network appliances or "middleboxes" to manage their networking infrastructure. ese middleboxes manage a wide-range of work ows for improving the e ciency (e.g., WAN optimizers), performance (e.g., caching, proxies), reliability (e.g., load balancers and monitoring), and security (e.g., rewalls and intrusion detection systems). Due to their wide-spread usage in the networking infrastructure, these middleboxes incur signicant deployment, maintenance, and management costs [42] .
To overcome these limitations, many enterprises are contemplating to outsource the middlebox processing services in the cloud [31, 42] . Cloud computing o ers the economies of scale for computational resources with the ease of management, elasticity, and fault tolerance. e realization of vision: "middleboxes as a service in the cloud" is strengthened by the advancements in so ware-de ned middleboxes, also known as Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [29] . Network Function Virtualization o ers a exible and modular architecture that can be easily deployed on the commodity hardware.
us, NFV is a perfect candidate to reap the outsourcing bene ts of the (edge) cloud computing infrastructure.
However, middleboxes that process con dential and private data cannot be securely deployed in the untrusted environment of the cloud. In the cloud environment, an accidental or, in some cases, intentional action from a cloud administrator could compromise the con dentiality and integrity of execution. ese threats of potential violations to the integrity and con dentiality of customer data is o en cited as a key barrier to the adoption of cloud services [36] .
To securely outsource middleboxes to the cloud, the stateof-the-art systems advocate network processing over the encrypted tra c [25, 43] . However, these systems support only restrictive type of middlebox functionalities, and incur prohibitively high performance overheads since they require complex computations over the encrypted network tra c.
ese limitations motivated our work-we strive to answer the following question: How to securely outsource the middlebox processing service on the untrusted third-party platform without sacri cing performance while supporting a wide range of enterprise NFs?
To answer this question, we propose S -a secure middlebox framework for deploying high-performance Network Functions (NFs) on untrusted commodity servers.
e architecture of S is based on four design principles: (1) Security -we aim to provide strong con dentiality and integrity guarantees for the execution of middleboxes against a powerful adversary, (2) Performance -we strive to achieve near-native throughput and latency, (3) Generality -we aim to support a wide range of network functions (same as plaintext processing) with the ease of programmability, and, (4) Transparency -we aim to provide a transparent, portable, and veri able environment for deploying middleboxes.
arXiv:1709.04226v1 [cs.CR] 13 Sep 2017
S leverages C [23] to provide a exible and modular framework to build a rich set of NFs using its outof-the box elements and C++ extensions. S leverages hardware-assisted secure enclaves based on I SGX to provide strong con dentiality and integrity properties [14] . To achieve high performance despite the inherent limitations of the SGX architecture, S builds on S [35] (a shielded execution framework) and I DPDK [2] to e ciently process packets in the userspace secure enclave memory. Finally, S builds on the container technology with a remote a estation interface [32] to provide a portable deployment and cryptographic veri able mechanism.
Using the S framework, the middlebox owner launches a S instance in the cloud and performs remote a estation, passing S an encrypted con guration in case of successful a estation. erea er, S executes user-de ned C elements, which are responsible for reading packets in the userspace directly from NIC, performing network tra c processing, and sending them back to the network. All elements run inside SGX enclave. Packets that must be processed under SGX protection are copied into the enclave explicitly. We e ciently execute the expensive network I/O operations (toand-from the enclave memory) by integrating S with DPDK.
Furthermore, we have designed several new design features for commonly required middlebox functionalities: (a) a remote a estation and con guration service for a seamless and veri able deployment of middleboxes in the cloud, (b) new C elements for secure packet processing, (c) an ecient and secure shared memory packet transfer in the multiple SGX enclaves setup for NFVs chaining [20] , (d) a secure state persistence layer for fault-tolerance/migration [41] , (e) an on-NIC PTP clock as the time source for the SGX enclaves, and (f) a memory protection mechanism to defend against DPDK-speci c Iago a acks [13] .
We have implemented the aforementioned security features, and also added several SGX-speci c performance optimizations to S . Lastly, we have evaluated the system using a series of microbenchmarks, and two case-studies: a multiport IP Router, and Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Our evaluation shows that S achieves near-native throughput and latency. In order to improve throughput, we limit memory copying by storing most of the packets outside the enclave, using more e cient data structures and preallocating memory. In order to reduce latency, we use NIC timer when necessary, and avoid unnecessary system calls by modifying C timer event scheduler.
Background
In this section, we present a brief necessary background about the three technical building blocks of S : shielded execution, DPDK, and C .
Shielded Execution
Shielded execution provides strong con dentiality and integrity guarantees for unmodi ed legacy applications running on untrusted platforms. Our work builds on S [35]-a shielded execution framework based on I SGX [14] .
Intel So ware Guard Extensions (SGX). I SGX is a set of ISA extensions for Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) released as part of the Skylake architecture. I SGX provides an abstraction of secure enclave-a memory region for which the CPU guarantees the con dentiality and integrity of the data and code residing in it. More speci cally, the enclave memory is located in the Enclave Page Cache (EPC)-a dedicated memory region protected by MEE, an on-chip Memory Encryption Engine. e MEE encrypts and decrypts cache lines with writes and reads in the EPC, respectively. e processor veri es that the read/write accesses to the EPC are originated from the enclave code. Furthermore, the MEE veri es the integrity of the accessed page to detect memory modi cations and rollback a acks.
However, the architecture of SGX su ers from two major limitations: First, the EPC is a limited resource, currently restricted to 128 MB (out of which only 94 MB is available to all enclaves). To overcome this limitation, SGX supports a secure paging mechanism to an unprotected memory. However, the paging mechanism incurs very high overheads depending on the memory access pa ern (2× to 2000×). Second, the execution of system calls is prohibited inside the enclave. To execute a system call, the executing thread has to exit the enclave. e system call arguments need to be copied in and out of the enclave memory. Such enclave transitions are expensive-especially, in the context of middleboxesbecause of security checks and TLB ushes.
SCONE. SCONE is a shielded execution framework for unmodi ed applications based on Intel SGX [35] . In the SCONE framework, the legacy applications are statically compiled and linked against a modi ed standard C library (SCONE libc). In this model, application's address space is con ned to the enclave memory, and interaction with the outside world (or the untrusted memory) is performed only via the system call interface.
e SCONE libc executes system calls outside the enclave on behalf of the shielded application. e SCONE framework protects the executing application from the outside world, such as untrusted OS, through shields. In particular, shields copy arguments of system calls inside and outside the enclave and provide functionality to transparently encrypt the data that leaves the enclave perimeter. Furthermore, SCONE provides a user-level threading mechanism inside the enclave combined with the asynchronous system call mechanism in which threads outside the enclave asynchronously execute the system calls [45] without forcing the enclave threads to exit the enclave.
Intel DPDK and Click
Intel DPDK. We build on the I DPDK library [2] that supports developing high-performance networked systems running on commodity hardware. e DPDK library allows processing of L2 packets from NIC directly in the userspace; thus it completely bypasses the OS networking stack to improve both the throughput and latency.
e DPDK library consists of three main components: Environment Abstraction Layer (EAL), memory management subsystem, and Poll Mode Drivers (PMD). EAL provides a uni ed way to initialize the central DPDK components (memory management, poll drivers, threading, etc.). e memory management unit of DPDK utilizes huge pages for the bu er management through its own memory allocator (mempool). e mbuf library provides functionality to store and process the raw packet data (which is directly mapped in the userspace virtual memory) in the memory blocks allocated from a mempool. Lastly, a PMD uses the memory rings on the NIC to directly send and receive packets without interrupts, thus achieving high CPU utilization.
Click. In addition to DPDK, we leverage C 's [23] programmable and extensible architecture for the implementation of NFs using its out-of-the-box elements and C++ extensions. In particular, C provides a data ow programming language that allows construction of middleboxes as a graph of elements-small, reusable, atomic pieces of network tra c processing functionality. erea er, C routes packets through the elements in the data ow graph. e modular architecture of C greatly improves the programmability, productivity, and dependability of middleboxes.
Overview
Basic design. At a high-level, the core of our system S consists of a simple integration of a DPDK-enabled C that is running inside the SGX enclave using S . Figure 1 shows the high-level architecture of S . While designing S , we need to take into account the architectural limitations of I SGX. As described in §2.1, an enclave context switch (or exiting the enclave synchronously for issuing system calls) is quite expensive in the SGX architecture. e S framework overcomes this limitation using an asynchronous system call mechanism [45] . While the asynchronous mechanism is good enough for commonly used services like HTTP servers or KV stores-it can not sustain the tra c rates of modern middleboxes. erefore, we decided to use the userspace DPDK I/O library as a be er t for the SGX enclaves to achieve high performance. Furthermore, we need to ensure that the memory footprint of S code and data is minimal, due to several reasons: As described in §2.1, enclaves that use more than 94MB of physical memory su er high performance penalties due to EPC paging (2× to 2000×). In fact, to process data packets at line rate, even stricter resource limit must be obeyed-the working set of the application must t into the L3 cache. erefore, our design diligently ensures that we incur minimum cache misses, and avoid EPC paging.
Besides performance reasons, minimizing the code size inside the enclave leads to a smaller Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and allows to reduce the a ack surface. e core of C is already quite small (6MB for a statically linked binary section that is loaded in the memory). We decrease its size by removing the unnecessary C elements at the build time. Importantly, we designed S with the packet-related DPDK data structures running outside of the enclave.
More speci cally, when the S runtime starts the application, it automatically places the application code, statically allocated data, and heap in the SGX-protected memory. is mechanism is in contrast the way DPDK operates-it by default allocates memory using x86 64 huge page mechanism, which reduces the TLB miss rate. Such pages are not supported inside the enclave; besides that, NIC can only deliver packets to the unprotected memory, and network tra c entering or leaving machine can be modi ed by a acker. erefore, we keep the huge pages enabled in DPDK outside the enclave, and explicitly copy packets that must be processed with SGX protection into the enclave. With this scheme, DPDK-created packet data structures are allocated outside the SGX enclave. We support an e cient data transfer between the DPDK and enclave and processing inside the enclave using the new secure C elements (detailed in §4.2). When S starts, it performs remote a estation and obtains the con guration. S initializes the DPDK subsystems, allocates huge page memory and takes the control over NICs that are available. en, it starts running C element scheduler, which reads packets from the NIC and passes them along the processing chain until they leave the system or are dropped. Packets that need SGX protection are explicitly copied into enclave.
reat model. We target a scenario where the middleboxes that process con dential and sensitive data are deployed in the untrusted cloud environment (or at the edge computing nodes at ISPs) [42] . Although the cloud providers are usually contractually obligated to not interfere with the compute and storage units, an accidental leakage, or even a malicious cloud operator might compromise the con dentiality and integrity of the execution [36] . In the context of middleboxes [25, 43] , a ackers might try to learn the contents of the encrypted data packets and con guration of the system such as cryptographic keys, ltering and classi cation rules, etc. Furthermore, a ackers might try to compromise the integrity of a middlebox by subverting its execution.
To circumvent such a acks, we protect against a very powerful adversary even in the presence of complex layers of so ware in the virtualized cloud computing infrastructure. More speci cally, we assume that the adversary can control the entire system so ware stack, including the OS or the hypervisor, and is able to launch physical a acks, such as performing memory probes.
However, we note that S is not designed to protect against side-channel a acks [48] , such as exploiting timing and page fault information. Furthermore, since the underlying infrastructure is controlled by the cloud operator we cannot defend against the denial-of-service a acks.
System work ow. Figure 2 shows the system work ow of S . As a preparation to the deployment, developers build middlebox container images, and upload them to an image repository (such as Docker Hub [1] ) using the S toolchain. Network operator, on the other hand, must bootstrap a Con guration and A estation Service (CAS) on a trusted host, and a Local A estation Service (LAS) on the host that will be running the middlebox. A er this, S can be installed on the target machine in the cloud using the container technology-either manually or deployed as a container image from the image repository. Alternatively, it can be installed by transferring a single binary to the target machine.
e S framework is bootstrapped using the Con guration and Remote A estation Service (CAS). e CAS service is launched either inside an SGX enclave of a (already bootstrapped) untrusted machine in the cloud or on a trusted machine under the control of the middlebox operator outside the cloud. Middlebox developers implement the necessary NFs as C con gurations and send them to the CAS service together with all necessary secrets.
Once the operator launched S in the cloud, it will connect to CAS and carry out the remote a estation (detailed in §4.1). If the remote a estation is successful, the S instance receives the con guration and necessary secrets. A er that, S can start processing the network tra c, with all the bene ts:
• Security: S provides strong con dentiality and integrity for the middlebox execution. We leverage hardware-assisted SGX memory enclaves to provide strong security properties. Step #1
Workflow steps: #1: Build and host middlebox images using the Slick toolchain #2: Launch the CAS service on a trusted host #3: Install the LAS service on a Slick host #4: Install a Slick middlebox from the repository #5: Provide Slick configuration and secrets to CAS #6: Perform remote attestation, configuration, and launch Slick
Steps #2, #5
Step #6
Steps #3, #6
Step #4
Figure 2: S system work ow
• Performance: S achieves near-native throughput and latency by building a high-performance networking I/O architecture for the shielded execution of middleboxes. We overcome the architectural limitations of I SGX enclaves by optimizing the combination of S and DPDK.
• Generality: S supports a wide-range of NFVs, same as supported in the plain-text network processing, without restricting any functionalities. We leverage C to provide a general framework to implement a wide-range of NFs.
• Transparency: Lastly, S provides network operators a portable, con gurable, and veri able architecture for the middlebox deployment in cloud. We build on the container technology with con guration and a estation services for a seamless deployment.
Limitation. We note that neither DPDK nor C support ow-based stateful tra c. is implies that S currently supports NFs that work on L2 and L3; as only restricted processing of L4-L6 tra c is supported. We plan to extend our system to support ow-based tra c with shielded execution by integrating a user-level networking stack [18] .
Design Details
We next present the design details of S . Figure 3 shows the detailed architecture of S .
Con guration and Remote Attestation
To bootstrap a trusted middlebox system in the cloud, one has to establish trust in the system components. While I SGX provides a remote a estation feature, a holistic system must be built for remote a estation and secure con guration of middleboxes [37] . To achieve this goal, we have designed a Con guration and A estation Service (CAS) for middleboxes. Figure 4 shows the system protocol for the CAS service. 
Figure 3: S detailed design
In order to a est an enclave using Intel Remote A estation, veri er (operator of a S instance) connects to the application and requests a quote. e enclave requests a report from SGX hardware and transmits it to the Intel oting Enclave (QE), which veri es, signs, and sends back the report. e enclave then forwards it to the veri er. is quote can be veri ed using the Intel veri cation service [3] .
Our remote a estation system extends Intel's RA service, and is integrated with a con guration system, which provisions S with its con guration in a secure way using a trusted channel established during a estation. is system consists of enclave-level library, Local A estation Service (LAS), and Con guration and A estation Service (CAS).
• Enclave library interacts with LAS and CAS to carry out remote a estation, and allows se ing environment variables, command-line arguments, and keys for the S shielding layer in a secure and condential manner.
• Local A estation Service is running on the same machine as S middlebox, and acts as a proxy for interaction with the Intel A estation Service (IAS). It also acts as the intermediate root of trust: once LAS is a ested, further S instances can be launched even when IAS is unavailable.
• Con guration A estation Service is running on a single (possibly replicated) node and stores con guration and secrets of the services built with S . It maintains information about a ested enclave instances, and provisions con guration to applications using the Enclave Library.
To bootstrap the system, the operator launches CAS, either on the host under his control or on the host in the cloud inside an SGX enclave. en, the CAS service is populated with con gurations and secrets using the REST API or a commandline con guration tool. LAS and IAS instances are launched on cloud hosts that will run S instances. During startup, each S instance establishes a TLS connection to CAS. Simultaneously, it connects to LAS to perform local a estation. In the case the LAS instance is not yet a ested, it will a est itself to CAS using Intel Remote A estation protocol, and then a est S instance to CAS using SGX local a estation. Local a estation veri es integrity of the S binary, and establishes whether S is running under SGX protection. is allows to remove distribution mechanisms (such as Docker Hub) from the TCB. A er that, S sends the LAS quote to CAS, and a secure channel is established between CAS and S . erea er, S obtains its con guration from the CAS service and transfers control to main S code.
Secure Elements
As described in §3, we designed S with the packet-related data structures of DPDK running outside the enclave. erefore, we needed an e cient way to support the communication between DPDK and the enclave memory region. In particular, we have to consider the overheads of accessing the SGX-encrypted pages from the main memory and copying of the data between the protected and unprotected memory regions. When possible, the data packets with plain-text contents should not be needlessly copied into the enclave, as it will degrade the performance. erefore, we designed specialized secure C elements (shown in Table 1 ) for copying the data packets into/outside the enclave to facilitate e cient communication. By default, packets are read from NIC queues into the untrusted memory. is reduces the overhead of using SGX when processing packets that are not encrypted and can be safely treated with less security mechanisms involved. Such packets are immediately forwarded or dropped upon header inspection. On the other hand, we must move packets into the enclave memory with explicit copy element. We have implemented such an element (ToEnclave), and use it to construct secure packet processing chains.
We have also added support for the commonly used AES-GCM cipher into S (Seal and Unseal elements). is allows us to construct VPN systems that use modern cryptographic mechanisms. is element was implemented using Intel ISA-L crypto library. In order to allow secure key generation inside the enclave, we have exposed S functions for ge ing SGXSeal keys to the S internal APIs. To allow building high-performance IDS systems based using S , we have created and element based on the HyperScan regular expression library. It allows fast matching of a number of regular expressions for the incoming packets, simplifying implementation of systems like Snort [5] .
We have also added elements that implement more broad mechanisms: DPDKRing ( §4.3) for NFV chaining, and StateFile ( §4.4) for state persistence in middleboxes.
NFVs Chaining
Typically NFVs are chained together to build a data ow processing graph with multiple C elements, spanning across multiple cores, sockets, and machines [20, 31] . e communication between di erent cores and sockets happens through the shared memory, and communication across machines via NICs over RDMA/In niband. DPDK supports NUMA systems and always explicitly tries to allocate memory from the local socket RAM nodes.
ToEnclave
Transfers a packet to enclave, frees the original packet However, unlike normal POSIX applications, SGX enclaves can not be shared across di erent sockets. ( e future SGXenabled servers might have support for the NUMA architecture.) As a result, in the current I SGX architecture, the users would need to run one S instance per each CPU socket. Another reason for cross-instance chaining is collocation of middleboxes from di erent developers that do not necessarily trust each other. In this case, developers would want to leverage SGX to protect the secrets. erefore, it is imperative for the S framework to provide an e cient communication mechanisms between enclaves to support high-performance NFVs chaining.
We built an e cient mechanism for communication between di erent S instances by leveraging existing DPDK features. In particular, DPDK already provides a building block for high performance communication between di erent threads or processes with its ring API. is API contains highly optimized implementations of concurrent, lockless FIFO queues which use huge page memory for storage. We have implemented the DPDKRing element (see Table 1 ) for S to utilize it for chaining. As huge page memory is shared between multiple S instances, the ring bu ers are shared as well and can be used as an e cient way of communication between multiple S processes. is solution requires assigning ownership of all shared data structures to a single process. For this, we rely on DPDK distinction between primary and secondary processes. Primary processes, the default type, request huge page memory from the operating system, allocate memory pools and initialize the hardware. Secondary processes skip device initialization and map the huge page memory already requested by the primary process into their own address space. In order to support NFV chaining using multiple processes on the same machine, we added support for starting S instances as secondary DPDK processes.
Depending on the process type, the DPDKRing element either creates a new ring (primary process) or looks up an existing ring (secondary process) in huge page memory. In S , packets pushed towards a DPDKRing element are enqueued into the ring and can be dequeued from the ring in another process for further processing. A bidirectional communication between two processes can be established by using a pair of rings.
Middlebox State Persistence
Middleboxes o en maintain useful state (such as counter values, Ethernet switch mapping, activity logs, routing table, etc.) for fault-tolerance [41] , migration [30] , diagnostics [47] , etc. To securely persist this state, we extend S with new APIs (shown in Table 2 ) for the state persistence in middleboxes. e Seal primitive is used to collect the state that must be persisted from the elements, and write it down in encrypted form to disk. Unseal reads this state from disk, decrypts it and populates the elements with this state.
To con gure this functionality, we have added a new conguration element to S , called StateFile (see Table 1 ). Its parameters are le to which state should be wri en and the key that should be used for encryption. Note that this information is transmi ed to S instance in the con guration string via remote a estation, and is not accessible outside the enclave. We don't use S le system shield, and instead encrypt and decrypt le as a single block. is ensures con dentiality and integrity of stored data via the use of AES-GCM cipher.
We do not a empt to extract the relevant state transparently. Instead, we rely on programmer providing necessary serialization routines that save only necessary parts of element state. ese routines are available in S as read and write handlers, and are triggered in the S startup procedure a er the con guration is loaded, parsed, and initialization of the basic components is nished, or manually via ControlSocket interface of the StateFile element. It's also possible to trigger them periodically via a timer.
NIC Time Source
Timer is one of the commonly used functionalities in middleboxes [29, 31] . It is used for a variety of purposes such as measuring performance, scheduling execution of periodicallytriggered NFs, etc.
e time measurement can be ne-grained or coarse-grained based on the application requirements. For the ne-grained cycle-level measurements, developers use rdtscp instruction, which is extremely cheap and precise. Whereas for the coarse-grained measurements, applications invoke system calls like gettimeofday or clock gettime.
However, in the context SGX enclaves, both rdtsc and system calls have unacceptable latency for their use in middleboxes to process the network tra c at line rate. More speci cally, the rdtscp instruction is forbidden inside the enclave, and therefore, it causes an enclave exit event; whereas, asynchronous system calls in S are submi ed though a system call queue that is optimized for the raw throughput, but not latency.
To overcome these limitations, we have opted to use the on-NIC PTP clock as the clock source for the enclave. is clock can be read inside the enclave reasonably fast (0.9 µsec, which is on the same scale of magnitude as reading HPET). Moreover, it neither causes enclave exits nor requires submi ing system calls. Furthermore, the on-NIC clock is extremely precise since it is intended to use for the PTP synchronization protocol.
We stress that this time source is not secure, and can be used as a denial of service a ack vector by the malicious operation system. However, the same is true for the other time sources-a trusted, e cient and precise time source for SGX enclaves remains an unsolved problem that will likely require changes to the CPU hardware [39] .
DPDK-Speci c Iago Attacks
Iago a acks [13] are a serious class of security a acks that can be launched on shielded execution to compromise the con dentiality and integrity properties. In particular, an Iago a ack originates through malicious inputs supplied by the untrusted code to the trusted code. In the classical se ing, a malicious OS can subvert the execution of an SGX-protected application by exploiting the application's dependency on correct values of system call return values [11] . e decision ( §3) to allocate huge pages for packet bu ers and DPDK rings has security implications. e fact that packets are passed through rings by reference, and DPDK bu ers contain pointers, opens a new a ack surface on S . A ackers with access to this memory region could modify pointers to point into the SGX-protected regions and make the enclave inadvertently leak secrets over the network.
To protect against DPDK-speci c Iago a acks, we have implemented a pointer validation function. More specically, the scheme uses an enclave parameter structure that is located inside the enclave memory and de nes the enclave memory boundaries. Pointers are validated by checking if they do not point into the enclave memory range [base,base + encla e size). We note that S is already protected against the classical syscall-speci c Iago a acks through S 's shielding interfaces.
is ensures that no pointers possibly pointing to the secrets stored in EPC are accepted through the unprotected huge page memory. Pointers can still be modi ed by a malicious a acker, but they can only point to the unprotected memory.
As it is possible for an application to enqueue and dequeue arbitrary pointers into DPDK's rte ring structures, it is not easily possible to integrate this pointer check directly into DPDK. Instead, we implemented these pointer checks in the DPDKRing and FromDPDKDevice ( §4.3) elements. If S detects a malicious pointer, it assumes an a ack, noti es the application operator and drops the packet.
Implementation

Toolchain
We built S 's toolchain using DPDK (version 16.11) and C (master branch commit 0e860a93). We further integrate it with the S runtime to compile S . e toolchain is based on the musl-cross-make [4] project, modi ed to use S libc instead of the standard musl-libc. We use gcc version 6.3.0 for the compilation process. is enables us to use both C and C++ code. musl-cross-make is also used to compile native version of C for the evaluation. We used Boost C++ library (version 1.63) to build a static version of the Hyperscan high performance regular expression matching engine (master branch commit 7aff6f61) and incorporated it into S
. We use WolfSSL library [7] to implement the remote a estation system and StateFile sealing, and packet Seal/Unseal elements. e toolchain contains automated scripts for building and deploying middlebox container images, and se ing up S and CAS services (as described in the system work ow in §3).
To make the compilation of S work with the S toolchain, some changes to DPDK were necessary. In particular, we need to remove the helper functions for printing stack tracebacks and provide some glibc-speci c structures and macros as well as kernel header les. C is implemented in C++ using mostly high level APIs and required no adaptions.
e resulting S binary is 8.2 MB in size, and around 16 MB including minimal runtime stack and heap allocation.
is implies that we could run roughly up to six instances of S in parallel on one processor without impacting the performance by EPC paging (system-wide EPC limit is 94 MB).
Memory Management
S implements it's own, in-enclave memory management, using EPC pages for all malloc and mmap anonymous memory allocation calls. Allocating huge page memory through this allocator is not possible without modi cations.
However, accessing huge pages in DPDK does not necessarily require bypassing S , because of the speci c way DPDK uses to allocate huge pages. Instead of passing MAP HUGETLB ag to mmap(), it opens shared memory les in the hugetlbfs virtual lesystem and passes those le descriptors to mmap call, which is not protected by S . is mmap le-to-memory mapping request is directly passed to the operating system by S .
Optimizations
In order to further improve the performance, especially for the case of DPDK running inside the enclave, we optimized the data path inside C . We used the Linux performance pro ling tool perf [6] to nd the bo lenecks.
Memory pre-allocation. e FromDPDK element allocated memory for packet descriptor storage on the stack each time the run task function was called. We pre-allocated this memory once in a constructor.
Branching hints. We inserted GCC-speci c unlikely / likely macros in several if-clauses. ese get translated to platform speci c instructions which instruct the processor to always try the given branch rst instead of using its built-in branch prediction.
Modulo operations. We replaced all modulo operations in the data path by compare-and-subtract operations (which are way less expensive in terms of processing time).
eue optimization. In the ToDPDKDevice C element we replaced the ine cient implementation of the queue (which used std::vector from the C++ standard library) by the rte ring structure provided by DPDK.
Timer event scheduler optimization. In the C timer event scheduler, we have optimized the code to reduce the amount of clock gettime system calls. is allowed us to reduce the latency in short element chains to the native level.
Evaluation
Experimental Setup
Testbed. We benchmark our system using two machines: (1) load generator, and (2) SGX-enabled machine. e load generator is a Broadwell Intel Xeon D-1540 (2.00GHz, 8 cores, 16 hyperthreads) machine with 32 GB RAM. e SGX machine under test is Intel Xeon E3-1270 v5 (3.60GHz, 4 cores, 8 hyperthreads) with 32 GB RAM running Linux kernel 4.4. Each core has private 32KB L1 and 256KB L2 caches, and all cores share a 8MB L3 cache. e load generator is connected to the test machine using 40 GbE Intel XL-710 network card. We use pktgen-dpdk for throughput testing. e test machine is con gured to use the maximum number of cores. e load generator saturates the link starting with 128 byte packets.
Applications. For the microbenchmarks, we use three basic C elements: (1) Wire, which sends the packet immediately a er receiving; (2) EtherMirror, which sends the packet a er swapping the source and destination addresses; and (3) Firewall, which does packet ltering based e Firewall element is con gured with 10 rules.
For the case-studies, we evaluated S using two applications: (1) a multiport IPRouter, and (2) an IDS.
Methodology. For the performance measurements, we consider several cases of our system:
• Native (SGX-independent) with and without generic optimizations.
• SGX-enabled S with and without optimizations.
• SGX-enabled S with the on-NIC timer.
roughput
We rst measure the throughput of three microbenchmark applications with varying packet size. S is running on four cores. Figure 5, Figure 6 , and Figure 7 
e results show that the performance of S matches the performance of C . In the case of Wire application with the packet sizes smaller than 256 bytes, S is be er than the native version. is is explained by the fact that C timer event scheduler optimization is missing in the native C , which removes some system call overhead from the Wire application. e impact is smaller with other applications, because they contain elements that reduce the relative overhead of C scheduler. We also see that S achieves line rate at 512 byte packets. Figure 9 , and Figure 10 present the throughput for Wire, Ethermirror, and Firewall, respectively. e scalability of both S and C is limited. We can see that the performance for both native and S peaks at four cores. ere are several reasons for this:
• DPDK and S work best with hyperthreading disabled.
• S runs system call threads to execute system calls asynchronously. When there are no system calls for a long time, they back-o (i.e. yield the CPU). ey wake up from back-o periodically, and as result, they preempt in-enclave threads.
Latency
To evaluate the in uence of S 's runtime environment on latency, we have also measured the packet processing latency using the following scheme: load generator runs an application, continuously generates a UDP packet and waits for its return spinning. We study packet round trip time measured at the load generator. On the S instance, we are running the EtherMirror application. (We omit the results for other applications due to the space constraints.) For this measurements, we did not perform any latency-speci c tuning of the environment other than thread pinning, which is enabled by default in DPDK. We expect that a production system with stringent requirements to low latency will use Figure 11 present the latency measurements for EtherMirror.
e low performance of S without optimizations is explained by the fact that S executes clock gettime system calls in the timer event scheduling code. S system calls are optimized for raw throughput with a large number of threads, but not for low latency; this makes the latency measurement result 3× worse than the native execution. We have considered the following latency optimizations:
• Reduced system call rate for immediately-scheduled timer events. It removes one system call round-trip from the packet latency.
• Modi ed scheduler that prioritizes immediately-scheduled events and allows to remove a system call from scheduler if there are no periodic timer events. One of the surprising results that we have is that each of these optimizations does not have a statistically signi cant in uence when applied individually, which can be explained by the fact that once the system call thread has le the backo mode, it will execute system calls with low individual overhead. On the other hand, when applied simultaneously, they return the latency to almost-native levels-in uence of SGX and S on the latency is extremely small. We consider using NIC timer as a separate optimization. One can see that reading NIC timer is a costly operation; it happens twice per packet in our measurements, adding approximately 0.9 * 2 = 1.8µsec to the total latency. On the Table 3 : Overheads of con guration and attestation other hand, it's much faster than executing clock-reading system calls, and can further improve system timeliness when combined with other optimizations.
Con guration and Attestation
We next evaluate the overheads of the con guration and a estation service in S . e measurement results are presented in Table 3 . e results show that remote a estation has negligible e ect on the S startup time. Furthermore, even though TLS session establishment is a costly operation, it is performed once per instance start-up, allowing operator to use a single CAS node for thousands of S instances.
ToEnclave Overhead
We next measure the throughput of the new secure ToEnclave element added in S , which is used to copy the packet data inside SGX enclave protected memory. We evaluate the impact of this extra data copy by measuring the throughput scaling with varying packet size. Figure 12 and Figure 13 show the results for Wire and EtherMirror, respectively.
As we can see that the overhead of the extra memory copy peaks with small packet sizes. is is due to the fact that for each received packet, operations with rather high overhead must be executed to allocate the packet. One way to reduce this cost would be to batch the memory allocation for all packets. It can be also seen that the overhead with S when compared to the native execution is relatively small: S with ToEnclave is running within 88% of the native version with extra memory copy in the worst case of small packet sizes, and within 60% of the native Click without ToEnclave element.
NFVs Chaining
To measure the throughput of the NFV chaining scheme, we have implemented a chaining application.
e chaining application implements packet communication between two S instances running on the same machine through a DPDK packet ring. One instance contains an application that receives packets from network and sends them to the other instance via the DPDKRing element. e second instance receives packets from the ring and sends them back through a di erent DPDKRing element. ese packets are received by the rst S forming a circular ring. erea er, the packets are transmi ed back to the load generating node. Please note that the packets cross the rings twice.
e chaining application showcases the worst-case throughput since the C elements are not performing any computation on the network packets. Figure 14 presents the throughput with varying packet size for the NFV chaining application. e results show that using the ring communication causes a substantial performance drop for S independent of the optimizations. is is mostly related to the way S runs enclaves-it must allocate constantly-running thread for the service threads created by S and DPDK. Due to this, there is interference between the service threads and processing cores, which decreases the throughput and also increases the result variance.
Packet Sealing Performance
We next evaluate the throughput of the Seal/Unseal secure elements. In particular, we use our AES-GCM encryption code running inside the SGX enclave (the same code is used for middlebox state persistence code). Figure 15 presents the throughput of the Seal element with varying packet size. e result shows that the code inside SGX enclave runs within 88% of the native performance irrespective of the optimizations applied. is is explained by the fact that most e di erence between the native and SGX version can be explained by di erent thread scheduling strategies used by S and native POSIX. In POSIX, threads are pinned to the real CPU cores, while in S , the userspace threads inside enclave are pinned to the in-enclave kernel threads. is makes thread pinning non-deterministic-sometimes two threads that are to be pinned to di erent cores are pinned to sibling hyper-threads.
Case Studies
We next evaluate S 's performance with the following two case-studies: (1) IPRouter, and (2) IDS.
IPRouter. IPRouter application is an adaptation of a multiport router C example application to our evaluation hardware. is application rst classi es all packets into three categories: ARP requests, ARP replies, and all other packets. ARP requests are answered. ARP replies are dropped. Other packets are passed to a routing table element that sends them to the NIC output port. Figure 16 shows the throughput of the IPRouter application with varying packet size. We can see that S has the same performance as C with packet sizes bigger than 256 bytes, and performs within 90% of C with smaller packets. We also measured the latency of the IPRouter application as presented in Figure 17 . We can see that even if the number of elements in the application increases, latency of the application remains the same as the native execution.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). IDS application implements NF that is commonly found in the enterprise network. It pushes the tra c through the rewall, and then performs S performs as close to the native C execution with a slight performance drop. is drop comes from the general SGX overhead for memory accesses. Due to the space constraints, we omit the latency measurement results for IDS.
Related Work
So ware middleboxes. C 's [23] modular architecture has been leveraged in the research community to build many useful so ware-based middlebox platforms [10, 12, 19, 19, 27, 29] . Our work also builds on the C architecture, but unlike the previous work, S focuses on securing the C architecture on the untrusted commodity hardware.
However, most C -based middleboxes operate at L2-L3 layer, with the notable exception of CliMB [26] . To support ow-based abstractions, many state-of-the-art middleboxes [8, 9, 17, 28, 28, 40] support comprehensive applications and use-cases. Since both C and DPDK are geared toward L2-L3 network processing, our current architecture does not support L4-L7 network functions. As part of the future work, we plan to integrate a high-performance userlevel networking stack [18] in the S framework to support the development of secure higher layer middleboxes.
Secure middleboxes. APLOMB [42] is one the rst systems to showcase that it is a viable alternative, performance-and cost-wise, to outsource middleboxes from the enterprise environment to the cloud. However, APLOMB does not consider the security implications of outsourcing in the cloud.
To overcome the limitation of APLOMB, the follow up systems, namely Embark [25] and BlindBox [43] , advocate network data processing over the encrypted tra c. In particular, BlindBox [43] proposes an encryption scheme based on garbled circuits to support string matching operations over encrypted tra c. However, Blindbox supports only restrictive type of middlebox functionalities, such as NFs for deep packet inspection. To overcome this limitation, Embark [25] extends BlindBox to support a wider range of middlebox functions. However, Embark su ers from prohibitively low performance as it involves complex cryptographic computations over the encrypted network tra c. In contrast, S supports a wide range of network functions (same as plaintext), and achieves a near-native throughput and latency.
e recently published workshop papers [15, 22] have elaborated the challenges and potential usages of SGX in the network applications. In the domain of network-intensive applications, SGX-Tor [21] is one of the rst systems to use SGX to enhance the security and privacy of Tor. In a similar vein, CBR [33] leverages SGX to support privacy-preserving routing. Likewise, the S project builds the rst comprehensive system using I SGX to secure middleboxes.
Shielded execution. Shielded execution provides strong security guarantees for legacy applications running on untrusted platforms [11, 24, 35, 38, 44, 46] . Our work leverages shielded execution based on I SGX. It is worth noting that unlike the prior usage of shielded execution for commonly used services like HTTP servers or KV stores, we need to adapt the shielded execution to process the network tra c at line rates. To achieve this, S is the rst system that integrates a high-speed packet I/O framework [2, 16, 34] with shielded execution.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of S -a secure middlebox framework for deploying high-performance Network Functions (NFs) on untrusted commodity servers. S exposes a generic interface based on C to design and implement a wide-range of NFs using its out-of-the box elements and C++ extensions. To securely process data at line rate, S is the rst system to integrate a high-performance I/O processing library (I 12 DPDK) with a shielded execution (S ) framework based on I SGX. We have also added several new useful features, and optimizations for secure network processing. Our evaluation using a wide-range of NFs and case-studies show that S achieves near-native throughput and latency.
